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The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia—FARC) was originally founded to protect Colombian peasants from harsh
landowner policies in exchange for food and supplies. Over time, it has evolved into
an internationally connected, narco-trafficking organization that displays little concern
for the peasants it once vowed to protect. In recent years, Colombian authorities have
become more adept at countering the FARC, forcing it to operate increasingly outside of
Colombia. The FARC’s transformation from a local insurgency into an internationally
connected one is the focus of this article. Using social network analysis it identifies key
leaders who are tied to this transformation and discusses implications concerning the
FARC’s future.
The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia—FARC), an insurgent group based in Colombia, is believed to be the oldest and,
at its height, the largest guerrilla group in the world, at least in the Americas. It was originally
founded in 1964 to protect rural peasants from the harsh policies of large landowners and
provide them with education in exchange for food and supplies.1 Over time it evolved into
an international organization that now controls the drug trade in Colombia and displays
little or no concern for the peasants it once vowed to protect. Violence associated with the
FARC against innocent civilians has more than doubled since 2000, and other forms of
human-rights violations abound.2 This has led many leftist intellectuals and much of the
international community, who once supported the FARC, to turn against it. At the same time
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478 D. Cunningham et al.
the Colombian government has become more adept in its counterinsurgency capabilities,
making it increasing difficult for the FARC to function in Colombia. This has forced it to
increasingly operate outside of Colombian borders and seek assistance from international
groups and governments that are either sympathetic to its goals or see it as a useful proxy
for pursuing their own interests.
The transformation of the FARC from a local insurgency into a more internationally
connected organization is the subject of this article. It begins with a brief history of the
FARC, from the roots of the conflict that contributed to its rise to its transformation into
a proxy of the South American Bolivarian movement led by Venezuela’s President Hugo
Chavez.3 This is followed by an overview of the FARC’s organizational structure. Next,
using the tools of social network analysis (SNA), it seeks to uncover key leaders who
are actively engaged in the FARC’s transformation. It then turns to a discussion of these
individuals, highlighting their current roles within the FARC, and what this possibly tells
us about the insurgency’s future. The article concludes with a brief reflection on the results
of the analysis as well as suggestions for future research.
An Abbreviated History of the FARC
The FARC was initially established as a military wing of the Colombian Communist Party
in the aftermath of La Violencia (“the Violence”), the ten-year period that followed the 1948
assassination of populist politician Jorge Elie´cer Gaita´n.4 However, the conflict that helped
produce La Violencia and give rise to the FARC had its roots in agrarian class divisions that
began to form in the sixteenth century with the advent of Spanish colonialism.5 Attempts
at land reform in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries did little to reduce the disparities
between large landowners and the people who worked for them, and conflict between the
two groups became increasingly common.6 This conflict was reflected in the divide between
Colombia’s Conservative and Liberal parties as well. The Conservative party identified more
with the interests of Colombia’s landowners, while the Liberal party identified more with
the interests of the country’s poor. The Conservative party dominated Colombian politics in
the early part of the twentieth century, but in 1930 the Liberal party captured the presidency.
This ushered in a sixteen-year period known as the “Liberal Republic” where the presidency
was occupied by a member of the Liberal party and the Liberal party attempted to reduce
the disparity between Colombia’s rich and poor.7 This resulted in increased tension between
conservative and liberals, ultimately leading to La Violencia:
The Liberal Republic ushered in a wave of state centralization and direct in-
tervention in the economy. . . . In 1932, an agrarian-reform proposal began to
develop in government whereby individuals could acquire legal ownership of
public lands merely by working the land. The social agenda instituted by the
Liberals during this period thus met with unwavering Conservative resistance
and increased tension between Conservative and Liberal partisans. These ten-
sions finally erupted as La Violencia.8
While order was, for the most part, maintained in Colombia’s urban areas, violence and the
breakdown of social order reined through most of the countryside, much of it the result of
state-sanctioned terror, which in turn gave rise to insurgent self-defense organizations.9 By
1953 the violence became so widespread that the military seized control of the government,
which at the time the Conservative Party was leading, and offered amnesty to insurgents, a
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however, in particular those aligned with the Communist party, refused to hand over their
arms and retreated to isolated areas of the country, in particular Tolima,10 where they
established self-defense communities and set up “parallel government structures, providing
food, security, and other sources of social support to local populations.”11
Civilian rule was restored in 1958 after moderate Conservative and Liberal party mem-
bers, along with dissident sectors of the military, united under a bipartisan coalition known
as the National Front. Interestingly, regardless of the outcome of particular elections, the two
parties agreed to alternate as to which party controlled the presidency and that all positions
in the three branches of government would be distributed evenly among the two parties.12
At the same time the influence and strength of some of the self-defense groups grew
and became a serious threat to the government. One such group, the “Marquetalia Self-
Defense Movement,” declared that Marquetalia13 was an independent republic and elected
Pedro Antonio Marin (aka “Tirofijo”) as its leader. The Colombian government initially
ignored the growing influence of these autonomous communities, but in 1964 it launched
the “Marquetalia Operation,” which sought to suppress both this guerrilla group and other
groups located in the south. The operation succeeded in recovering the territory, but the
nucleus of the group escaped and later reorganized as the “Southern Bloc” (Bloque Sur) in
1964. At a follow-up meeting (or conference) in 1966, the group renamed itself the Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and appointed Tirofijo (i.e., Pedro Antonio
Marin) as its commander.
In the 1960s and ‘70s the FARC held four more conferences, but it was its seventh in
May 1982 that signaled a major shift in its strategy.14 Up until that time the FARC had fought
primarily in rural areas and limited itself to small-scale confrontations with the Colombian
forces, but it now saw itself as expanding into an irregular army that could stage large-scale
attacks against the Colombian government.15 Specifically, it identified three stages in its
struggle to liberate Colombia’s peasant population: (1) A general offensive throughout the
country in order to weaken the military forces and the government and to generate chaos;
(2) the installation of a provisional government composed by revolutionary members; and
(3) the defense of the revolution to eliminate any remaining forces and consolidate the
government.16 To accomplish these goals, the FARC concluded that it had to grow both in
terms of members and wealth, so it gradually became involved in Colombia’s burgeoning
illegal drug trade, by taxing drug producers and traffickers, as well as providing protection
to coca fields, laboratories, and illegal airstrips. Its involvement in this industry helped it
grow from approximately 2,000 soldiers in 1982 to more than 18,000 in 2001, but it also led
to friction with drug traffickers and created a situation where the latter would occasionally
side with government efforts to reduce the FARC’s influence.17 This friction, however,
led the FARC to become progressively involved in additional steps in the drug trafficking
process in order to ensure and solidify the valuable income, such as coca cultivation, which
ultimately paid off after the death of Pablo Escobar and the fall of the Cali cartel.18
In August 1982 Belisario Betancur became president and initiated a peace process
with four guerrilla groups—the FARC, the Popular Liberation Army (EPL), the 19th of
April Movement (M-19), and the National Liberation Army (ELN).19 This led to the 1984
Uribe Agreement (named for the municipality in which it was signed) that called for a
cease-fire in which the FARC agreed to renounce kidnapping, blackmail, and terrorism,
and the government promised that it would make concerted efforts to promote the education,
health, and economic well-being of all Colombians.20 The FARC accepted the cease-fire
agreement, and along with a number of other leftist and communist groups, formed the
Union Patriotica (Patriotic Union— UP), a political party that sought a number of political





































480 D. Cunningham et al.
most were not.21 The UP was initially successful, doing better in the elections than any other
leftist party had ever done in Colombian history. In 1986 UP candidates (including former
FARC commanders) won 350 local seats, 23 deputy positions, nine seats in the House of
Representatives, and six in the Senate, and three years later, it won mayoral elections in
23 counties. Its success was short-lived, however. In part because it was associated with
FARC, the UP became the victim of political attacks from conservative paramilitary forces,
drug traffickers, and rogue military forces. It eventually disbanded after the assassination
or disappearance of approximately 4,000 of its members.22
In 1985 Colombia’s major insurgent groups (EPL, FARC, M-19, and ELN) came
together under an umbrella organization known as the Guerrilla Coordinating Board. In
1987 the group renamed itself the Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Coordinating Board (CGSB) and
facilitated negotiations between various guerrilla groups and the Colombian government.23
Some of these efforts were successful; some were not. The M-19 and EPL demobilized, but
the FARC and the ELN did not although they continued negotiating with the Colombian
government through 1993 when the CGSB disbanded and the FARC and ELN went their
separate ways.
In March 1993 the FARC held its eighth conference where it adopted a new military
strategy and decided that it would increase its efforts to attract broad international support.
In support of the latter goal it attempted to portray FARC guerillas as freedom fighters, it
established contacts in other countries to assure refuge from political persecution by the
Colombian government, it formed ties with international weapons traffickers to strengthen
its logistical system, and it highlighted any and all human rights violations by the Colom-
bian government.24 It also established the International Front or International Committee
(COMINTER) to serve as its diplomatic body and pursue its international objectives. The
front quickly expanded its operations to cover 27 Latin American and European countries.25
In terms of adopting a new military strategy, it turned to a mobile, multifront approach
and improved its battlefield tactics, such as the use of cylinder bombs, which helped lead
to a series of military victories over Colombian forces:
• On 30 August 1996, the FARC attacked a 1996 Army base located in Las Delicias,
Putumayo. After 17 hours, the outpost surrendered. 31 soldiers were killed, 17 were
injured, and 60 were taken hostage.26
• On 21 December 1997, approximately 300 FARC soldiers attacked an Army commu-
nications relay station located in Patascoy, Narin˜o. After a 30-minute engagement,
the group killed 22 soldiers and took 18 hostage.27
• On 2 March 1998, 400 guerrillas from the Southern Bloc attacked a small, newly
formed Army counterguerrilla battalion comprised of 152 soldiers in El Billar Ca-
queta´. After 24 hours, they killed 65 soldiers and took 43 hostage.28
• On 3 August 1998 more than 500 FARC guerrillas simultaneously attacked an
Army Company and a National Police Counter-Narcotics detachment in Miraflores
Guaviare. After more than 30 hours of battle, the FARC killed 30 soldiers/policemen
and took approximately 100 hostage.29
• On 1 November 1998, more than 1,500 FARC soldiers seized Mitu´, the capital city
of Vaupes. The city only had 120 police officers and within 48 hours, the FARC had
killed 37 and taken 61 hostage.30
By 1998, the overall security situation in Colombia had deteriorated to such an extent
that President Andres Pastrana granted the FARC a five county, 42,000 square kilometer
safe haven, (i.e., a demilitarized zone—DMZ) in the hope that his gesture would jump





































Brokers and Key Players in the Internationalization of the FARC 481
commencing peace talks, the talks progressed slowly, and the FARC used the DMZ as
a rearguard area where it conducted training, replenished supplies, treated the sick and
wounded, and prepared for attacks on military and police units, villages, and the country’s
energy and transportation infrastructure.32 Coca crops existed in the DMZ, and the FARC
took advantage of and increased the size and quantity of the fields as well as its involvement
in the drug trade. The FARC not only taxed growers, but it also bought coca paste to resell.
In some cases, it built the basic and hydrochloride (HCL) labs for producing coca paste
and pure cocaine. It also controlled illegal airstrips in the zone, which in turn facilitated
the transport of the coca paste outside the DMZ.33 At this stage the FARC was not heavily
involved in the smuggling of cocaine, most of which was controlled by the United Self-
Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia— AUC).34 This fact, along
with a series of high-profile terrorist actions such as the kidnapping several politicians and
the presence of three Provisional Irish Republic Army (PIRA) members teaching bomb-
making methods to the FARC, led President Pastrana to declare an end to the peace talks
and ordered Colombian forces to retake the DMZ.35 Shortly after the talks ended, the
FARC kidnapped Ingrid Betancourt, a presidential candidate, who was traveling in FARC-
controlled territory.36
With the ascension of Alvaro Uribe to the presidency in 2002, the Colombian govern-
ment renewed its assault on the FARC. Uribe had campaigned on an anti-FARC platform
and was determined to defeat it,37 largely because the FARC had killed his own father
in an attempted kidnapping in 1983.38 Soon after taking office, Uribe launched a large
military operation into FARC-controlled territory that proved quite successful: The FARC
lost territory it had controlled for years, it was forced to retreat into the Colombian jungles,
and thousands of its fighters were either killed or captured and even more deserted.39 The
FARC also lost a number of key leaders as a direct result of operations, such as Luis Edgar
Devia Silva (a.k.a. Raul Reyes), FARC’s second-in-command, and Tomas Medina Caracas,
who was in charge of the FARC’s drug trade.40
The FARC’s popularity also waned during this time, largely because of its well-
documented human rights violations, some of which dated back to the 1990s.41 For example,
its use of cylinder bombs led to numerous civilian casualties because of their inaccuracy,
and in 1998 it attacked the town of Mitu, located in the southern Amazon jungle, killing
80 policemen and 15 civilians.42 Then in 1999 it received worldwide condemnation for
killing three indigenous human rights activists, who were working with the U’Wa people
to build a school for U’Wa children.43 Such instances were just the beginning, however, as
the FARC’s indiscriminate use of violence increased over time:
• According to witnesses, 1999 the FARC left a town in Antioquia in ruin and executed
21 police officers, many of who were seeking medical assistance at a hospital.44
• In 2003 and 2004 the FARC participated in a wide variety of coercive activities that
included the intimidation of noncombatants.45
• When criticized for killing 34 coca gatherers in June 2004, the FARC responded
that international humanitarian law was a “bourgeois concept” that it did not have
to obey.46
• In July of 2004, the FARC killed seven peasants and displaced eighty others in San
Carlos, Antioquia, which led the office of the United Nations’ High Commissioner
for Human Rights to publicly condemn the group.47
• This condemnation did not deter the FARC, however. In September of 2004 the
group returned to San Carlos where they detonated a mine and opened fire on a





































482 D. Cunningham et al.
The FARC’s loss of popular support has left it with limited options for a successful
outcome in Colombia. In order to maintain its viability, it has begun to increasingly rely on
its international connections to gain political and financial support, establish safe havens,
and undermine the Colombian government.49 In particular, it has focused on forming ties
with the governments of Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua.50 Ties with Venezuela are of
particular interest because they suggest that the FARC is in the process of transforming itself
into a transnational proxy of the South American Bolivarian movement led by Venezuela
President Hugo Chavez.51 That is why it should not have been too much of a surprise
that when the FARC released two political hostages in January 2008, it handed them over
to the Venezuelan, rather than the Colombian, government.52 The timing of the release
was not coincidental, either, for on the next day, during his annual state of the nation
address, President Cha´vez asked Colombian President Uribe and the governments of the
Continent and Europe to recognize the FARC as a belligerent force rather than as a terrorist
group.53 This would grant the FARC rights enjoyed by sovereign states, such as diplomatic
privileges, the ability to sign international treaties, trade legally (including weapons), and
recognition that it was seeking to establish a separate and independent state.54 We now turn
to a brief overview of the FARC’s organizational structure, which provides background
necessary for the analysis that follows.
The FARC Organizational Structure
The FARC’s command structure is complex, which makes defeating it through leadership
targeting difficult. It is ostensibly a hierarchical organization with a well-defined chain of
command and rank structure at the higher levels of authority with semi-distributed command
system that extends across a huge territorial expanse in both rural and urban environments.
The FARC’s current structure was adopted during its ascendancy period in 1993 when it
was convinced that it needed a mechanism for transforming the movement into a maneuver
warfare force.55 Its hybrid structure, which includes elements of both a dispersed operational
force and a hierarchical command structure, would, in theory, allow the forces to avoid a
decisive defeat by the Colombian government, ensure that strategies could be resourced
effectively, and allow the FARC to continue the control the pace of the insurgency.
The FARC’s strategies and operational policies are determined by the Central High
Command, which includes the Secretariat, which has five permanent members, one of whom
is the Commander-in-Chief, and two supplemental members, and the Estado Mayor Central
(EMC) (General Staff), which has approximately thirty members.56 Both the Secretariat
and the EMC coordinate the activities of the individual blocks. Below the Central High
Command, the FARC is broken down into seven blocs or commands. There are five regional
blocs (i.e., Eastern, Southern, Northwestern, Caribbean, and Middle Magdalena) and two
joint commands (i.e., the Joint Central Command and Joint Western Command). The blocs
are composed of at least five fronts, each of which receives its guidance from a bloc
commander, who is also a member of the EMC, while the joint commands consist of four
or fewer fronts led by a coordinator who receives guidance directly from the FARC senior
leadership. Historically, the blocs have had a larger degree of local control and freedom
of movement than the joint commands. They also have dedicated support staffs, while the
joint commands are much more reliant on the ability of the coordinator to disseminate
information.57 There is a notional General Command comprised of select members of the
Secretariat and the bloc commanders in order to better coordinate a military campaign
against the Colombian military, but it has yet to be activated as the FARC has been unable
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of specialized mobile columns that focus on specific tasks, including but not limited to the
following:58
• The Heroes of Maquetalia was established to provide personal protection to former
FARC leader Alfonso Cano and was led by Magaly Grannobles until her death in
an armed clash with Colombian Special Forces in July 2010.
• The Teo´filo Forero mobile column is one of the FARC’s most aggressive structures
and is composed of approximately 90 specialized militants that operates mostly in
the Southern Bloc.
• The Yesid Ortiz mobile column operates primarily in the Southern Bloc whose main
goal is to regain previously lost territory.
• The Red Urbana Antonio Narin˜o mobile column (RUAN), or the Antonio Narin˜o
Urban Network, operates in urban settings and since 2002 has been predominantly
located in Bogota´.59
• The Alfonso Castellanos mobile column, which reportedly operates in the Arauca
department bordering Venezuela.
As previously mentioned, the FARC also has an International Bloc, which seeks to secure
international support from like-minded groups and governments as well as improve its abil-
ity to interact with other transnational terrorist groups and international criminal cartels.60
This article now turns to the tools of SNA in order to uncover current and future leaders
of the FARC who are actively engaged in the continual transformation of the FARC from
simply a local insurgency into an internationally networked movement. It begins with a
brief description of the data and methods that will be used in this analysis. It then draws on
a series of SNA metrics (brokerage, key player, and emergent leader) in order to identify
individuals with the FARC who are either currently or potentially in a position to facilitate
the FARC’s transformation. The analysis next turns to a discussion of these individuals, what
their current roles are within FARC, and what this may tell us about the future of the FARC.
Data and Methods
The data used in the following analysis were coded from official documentation from the
Colombian government, academic works on the group, and open source media reports
of FARC activity. Initially, we coded a series of “demobilization reports,” which include
extensive relational and attribute data, of former FARC members who demobilized and
provided information to the Colombian authorities with regards to FARC units operating
inside of Colombia. In order to account for the FARC’s international network, we supple-
mented these data with the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ exceptional report
that draws information from the Raul Reyes computer seized by Colombian authorities
in 2008.61 We then turned to open source reports, such as news articles and academic
publications, to fill in potential gaps in the data.
The data are a mix of one- and two-mode network data on a variety of relations
(e.g., kinship, communications, meetings, and mentor/student) and group affiliation among
198 individuals and 84 organizations/groups, most of which are FARC fronts, companies,
columns, and so on. Given our interest in potential brokers, key players, and emerging
leaders, these data contain only actors who were “Alive and Free” at the time of the report and
positioned at the higher echelons of leadership, namely actors who have achieved leadership
roles at the front-level and above. These actors can serve as any type of commander
(i.e., “cabecilla”) at these levels. For example, commanders fourth in line within any given





































484 D. Cunningham et al.
to the individual level. Specifically, one-mode network data were derived from the two-
mode group data and aggregated with the one-mode personal data into a multirelational
network. The aggregated network was then dichotomized in order to visualize the networks
and calculate the variety of metrics estimated in this article.62
The following analysis draws on both network visualizations and the estimation of
SNA metrics.63 It draws on both because by themselves, visualizations and metrics are
often inadequate. Metrics provide detailed estimations of actor’s positions within networks
but “are insufficient to fully appreciate and understand the structural information contained
in network data,” which is why network visualizations are also valuable tools in the analysis
of networks.64 It is to metrics and visualizations that this article now turns.
Analysis and Results
The goal of the following analysis is to determine, using a variety of SNA algorithms,
whether there are certain individuals within the FARC who are consistently found to be lo-
cated in positions within the network that provide them with the potential for leadership. The
analysis begins by identifying brokers in the FARC network. Brokers are individuals who
find themselves in a position to control the flow of information and other resources through
the network and/or mediating between two (or more) otherwise unconnected actors.65 As
McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly note,66 brokerage is often the mechanism through which vio-
lence and other forms of contention spread, thus it is an important mechanism to identify
in the present context. The analysis then turns to the identification of key players, including
not only those whose removal would fragment the network, but also those whose position
facilitates the diffusion of information (or disinformation) through the network. Finally, it
turns to a series of algorithms that seek to identify emergent leaders, namely those individ-
uals who are in a position to take over the leadership of the FARC if current leaders were
removed from the network.
Brokers and Brokerage
There are a number of SNA algorithms available to help analysts identify actors in a
network that are in positions of brokerage. This article focuses on three: betweenness
centrality, constraint, and brokerage roles. Betweenness centrality calculates the extent to
which each actor in a network lies on the shortest path (i.e., geodesic) between all other
actors in a network.67 It assumes that such actors are potentially influential because they
are in a position to broker connections between other actors such that they can bring to
bear the influence of one actor over another or to serve as a gatekeeper between the two.
Figure 1 presents the FARC social network where node size varies in terms of betweenness
centrality (i.e., the larger the node, the higher the betweenness centrality). As the graph
indicates certain individuals figure more prominently in the network than do others. These
results are also displayed in the first column of Table 1, which lists the top fifteen actors in
terms of normalized (i.e., standardized) betweenness centrality.
Constraint is a measure developed by Ron Burt that builds on Granovetter’s study
that found that weak ties are more likely to function as bridges between groups than are
strong ties.68 Burt’s analysis directs attention away from the strength of a tie and toward
the gaps in the network (what he calls “structural holes”) that they span. He argues that
individuals whose ties span these gaps, regardless of whether they are weak or strong, are
at a competitive advantage over those whose ties do not because the former provide actors
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Figure 1. FARC network (node size equals betweenness centrality). (Color figure available online).
for tapping into this competitive advantage and is inversely related to brokerage potential.
Figure 2 presents the FARC social network where node size varies in terms of constraint
(i.e., the larger the node, the higher the constraint). While the variation in node size is not as
pronounced here as it was in Figure 1, the analysis identifies many of the same individuals
as before. Again these results are displayed Table 1 (column two) which ranks the top ten
actors in terms of constraint (the next five individuals “tied” for eleventh place).69
Group affiliation is often an important factor in brokerage processes. For example, in
brokering deals in Congress, U.S. Representatives not only take into account their own
interests and desires but also the political party of which they are apart. While they very
much might want to support a particular bill, their party membership may constrain what
they are able to do and say. Roger Gould and Roberto Gonzalez70 attempted to capture this
dynamic by laying out five different types of brokerage roles that actors can play based their
group affiliation ties: (1) coordinators, (2) itinerant brokers/consultants, (3) representatives,
(4) gatekeepers, and (5) liaisons:
• Coordinators—Mediate between members of one group where the mediator is also
a member of the group
• Itinerant Brokers/Consultants—Mediate between members of one group where the
mediator is not a member of the group
• Representatives—Mediate between two groups where mediator regulates the flow
of information or goods from his or her group
• Gatekeepers—Mediate between two groups where mediator regulates the flow of
information or goods to his or her group
• Liaisons—Mediate between two groups where mediator does not belong to either
group
When Gould and Fernandez identified these brokerage roles, they did so with directed














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Brokers and Key Players in the Internationalization of the FARC 487
Figure 2. FARC network (node size equals constraint). (Color figure available online).
direction, however, only distinguishes between the representative and the gatekeeper roles.
That is, when analyzing an undirected network (i.e., when all ties are reciprocated), the
representative and brokerage role scores will be the same. That is the case in this article.
Additionally, since in this article we are only interested in brokers between groups (rather
than within them), we limit our analysis to identifying itinerant brokers/consultants,
gatekeepers, and liaisons.71
Columns 3–5 in Table 1 present the results of the brokerage role analysis. As they
indicate, only one individual is identified as a consultant, fifteen are identified as gate-
keepers, and one is identified as a liaison. Figure 3 summarizes these results by varying
node size by the aggregated score of the three measures. As it illustrates, the Gould and
Fernandez approach identifies fifteen unique individuals within the FARC network who lie
in a position where they can broker between groups. That they correlate highly with those
who were identified using betweenness centrality and Burt’s measure of structural holes
should not be seen as coincidental.
Key Players
Actors whose removal disconnects a network are generally called cut-points, cut-vertices,
articulation points, and/or boundary spanners. They are seen as crucial to the flow of
resources in a network. In well-connected networks, however, it is unusual that there
are individual actors whose removal can disconnect the network. To address this issue
Borgatti developed a series of algorithms that instead seek to identify sets of actors whose
removal significantly fragments the network. Two variations of the algorithm exist. The
first (“Fragmentation”) uses the standard measure of fragmentation, which is the ratio of
disconnected pairs of actors72 in the network over the total number of pairs of actors in the
network, to gauge how much various sets of actors fragment the network when they are





































488 D. Cunningham et al.
Figure 3. FARC network (node size equals total brokerage score). (Color figure available online).
after the removal of each of the sets, and the set that increases the level of fragmentation the
most is considered optimal. The second (“Distance-weighted Fragmentation”) is similar to
the first except that rather than using the standard fragmentation measure, it uses a distance-
weighted measure, that identifies the optimal set of actors whose removal lengthens the
average distance (in terms of path length) between all pairs of actors in the network.
Recognizing that the removal of actors may not always be the best or desired strategy
when working with dark networks (i.e., covert and illegal networks),73 but instead analysts
may want to “select an efficient set of actors to surveil, to turn (as into double-agents), or to
feed misinformation to,” Borgatti developed two additional algorithms that seek to identify
the optimal set of actors for the diffusion of information or other resources (material or
nonmaterial) through the network. These algorithms are designed to find the optimal set of
actors that reaches the highest number of other actors. The first (“Percent Nodes Reached”)
simply counts the proportion of distinct actors reached by the set of key actors, while the
second (“Distance-Weighted Reach”) weights this calculation by the path distance between
the set of key actors and all other actors in the network.
Table 2 presents the results of an analysis that identified the optimal set of 15 actors for
each of the four key player algorithms.74 Note that the key player algorithms do not rank
actors within a set; they only identify them as members of a set. Hence, Table 2 presents the
individuals alphabetical, not rank, order. As it indicates Borgatti’s key-player algorithms
identified a handful of individuals that the previous analyses did not. At the same time,
however, they selected twelve individuals who repeatedly were among the top ranked indi-
viduals in Table 1 and appeared in at least two of the three figures (i.e., Figures 1–3) above.
Emergent or Potential Leaders
Finally, we turn to identifying what are referred to as emergent or potential leaders. The
algorithms used for this task trace their roots to work on cognitive demand by Kathleen

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































490 D. Cunningham et al.
the extent to which each actor is connected to other actors, possesses knowledge key to
the network’s operations, has access to valued resources, and demonstrates expertise in
tasks valuable to the network.76 They contend that actors scoring high in cognitive demand
are emergent or potential leaders; namely, those who by virtue of their position in the
network are engaged in so many diverse cognitive activities that they act as change agents
directing the activities of others. Not surprisingly, the network analysis software package
developed by Carley, Organizational Risk Analyzer (ORA),77 implements the cognitive
demand/emergent leader algorithm and is used for estimating the emergent leader metrics
displayed in Table 3.
Others have picked up on this notion and have developed their own measures to detect
emergent or potential leaders. One that we use below argues that emergent leaders are those
who score high in terms of degree centrality but low in terms of eigenvector centrality.
Degree centrality is the simplest of the centrality measures as it is simply a count of the
number of ties an actor has. For example, in a friendship network, an actor with a degree
centrality of five has five friends. Eigenvector centrality is related to degree centrality in
that the number of ties an actor has is important; however, in this case an actor’s ties
are weighted by whether his or her ties are to central or peripheral actors.78 Returning to
the example of the friendship network, if two actors both have a degree centrality of five but
one is tied to highly central actors while the other is tied to peripheral ones, the former will
score higher in terms of eigenvector centrality than the latter. In this analysis, this emergent
leader measure is calculated by subtracting normalized (i.e., standardized) eigenvector
centrality from normalized degree centrality.
The results of this analysis appear in the first two columns of Table 3. The first presents
the alternative emergent leader scores, while the second presents Carley and Ren’s cognitive
demand scores. Although the results differ somewhat, there is still considerable overlap.
Six individuals (Carvajalino, Granda, Palomino, Diaz, Benavides, and Urbano) appear in
both rankings, albeit in a different order.
Summary
The final column of Table 3 summarizes this analysis of brokers, key players, and emergent
leaders. It ranks the top ten individuals by the proportion of times that they appeared in a
particular metric’s ranking. For instance, Rodrigo Granda ranks in the top fifteen of every
metric except in the Gould and Fernandez consultant brokerage role. In fact, he was one of
two individuals (Alias Cadete being the other) who appeared in all four key player sets. The
individuals who immediately follow Granda (i.e., Jesus Emilio Carvajalino Carvajalino,
Hermillo Cabrera Diaz, and Erasmo Traslavina Benavides) tied in terms of the proportion
of times they appeared in each metric’s rankings. However, because Carvajalino was ranked
in the top three in 42.86 percent of the various metrics used in this study, as compared to
14.29 percent for Diaz and 0 percent for Benavides, he is ranked ahead of the other two, and
Diaz is ranked ahead of Benavides.79 Four other individuals, Orlay Jurado Palomino, Luis
Alberto Alban Urbano, Hernan Dario Velasquez Saldarriaga, and Luciano Marı´n Arango,
also tied in the summary rankings, appearing in 54.55 percent of the rankings. In Table 3
they are listed in terms of the percentage of times they appeared in the top three of each
metric. Because Saldarriaga and Arango appeared in the top three (14.29 percent) and the
top five (28.57 percent) the same number of times, they are listed by their average rank
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Discussion
This analysis has uncovered a series of individuals who appear to be significant players
within the FARC network. Interestingly, of the ten that appear in the third column of
Table 3, only two (Arango and Diaz) are listed as known leaders of the FARC by
Wikipedia.80 This highlights one of SNA’s potential strengths: namely, its ability to not
only identify known leaders within an organization, but to identify other actors who either
are or are at least in the position to exert influence on a group’s operations. Here, SNA
has identified several FARC members who appear to be flying below the conventional wis-
dom radar, but are most likely playing (or will play) key roles in the FARC. Interestingly,
several of these individuals do not live in Colombia. Some live in neighboring Venezuela,
while others bounce between Colombia and other countries, suggesting that the FARC’s
international presence is increasingly important. What follows is a brief discussion of these
individuals. Rather than examine all ten individuals listed in Table 3’s summary rankings,
however, the discussion focuses only on those eight who appeared in more than half of the
rankings. It begins by discussing the two “known” leaders of the FARC (Arango and Diaz)
before turning to a discussion of the “lesser known” six. (Granda, Carvajalino, Benavides,
Saldarriaga, Benavides, and Urbano).
Luciano Marı´n Arango
Also Known As: Iva´n Ma´rquez, Compadre, and Pescado (Fish)
Several SNA algorithms used in this analysis identified Luciano Marı´n Arango as play-
ing a central or key role in the FARC, including the two brokerage measures (betweenness
and constraint), the gatekeeper/representative metric, and the two fragmentation algorithms
(see Table 1). Arango joined the FARC in 1985 and became a member of the Secretariat
after Luis Alberto Morantes, alias “Jacobo Arenas,” died in 1990. Arango is reportedly the
FARC’s second-in-command and has extensive political experience, including membership
in the UP and serving as an alternate congressman in Caqueta´ in the 1980s.81 He currently
lives in Venezuela and is the FARC’s foreign minister as well as an advisor to the North-
west and Caribbean Blocs cocaine.82 In Venezuela he has represented the FARC during
negotiations for a swap of hostages held by the FARC and FARC guerillas imprisoned
by the Colombian government. He has also been instrumental in developing the FARC’s
ties with the Colombian drug cartels and for setting its policies directing and controlling
the production, manufacture, and distribution of cocaine. He also developed the concept
of taxing the narcotics trade in Colombia, which has created a robust and much-needed
revenue stream for the FARC. Thus, there are good reasons why he is known quantity and
that there is a $5 million reward for his arrest and/or conviction.83
Hermilo Cabrera Diaz
Also Known As: Bertulfo, Comandante Bertulfo Alvarez and Ermilo Cabrera Diaz
Hermillo Cabrera Diaz is a well-known member of the FARC’s General Staff and
is a “Suplente” (i.e., Reserve) member of the FARC Secretariat.84 He is also the head
of the Caribbean Bloc and reportedly operates out of Venezuela.85 Several metrics used
for this analysis provide additional evidence to his key role in the leadership network,
including the gatekeeper/representative metric, both brokerage potential measures, the two
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suggest he is in a favorable position to control the flow of material and nonmaterial goods
within the network. His central role in the FARC’s cocaine operations is a likely factor
contributing to these results. In fact, the U.S. Department of State (DOS) identifies him,
like Luciano Marı´n Arango, as a critical player in setting cocaine policies and directing
and controlling the production, manufacture and distribution of cocaine to the United
States.86 Consequently, the DOS offers a reward up to $2.5 million for information leading
to his arrest and/or conviction. Bertulfo’s reported health problems, however, may negate
his ability to capitalize on his emerging leader potential along with potentially limiting
his opportunities to continue gaining influence in the network.87
Rodrigo Granda
Also Known As: Rodrigo Granda Escobar, El Gallo (Cockerel), Ricardo Gonzalez, Ricardo
Tellez, and R.T
Rodrigo Granda is a well-known member of the FARC’s International Front, where
he is second-in-command and serves as the international spokesman, and he is a member
of the General Staff. Thus, it is little surprise that he ranks in over 90 percent of the
metrics used in the analysis (Tables 1–3). The results suggest he serves as a structural
liaison, a gatekeeper/representative, an emerging leader, and he is located in a structurally
advantageous position to control the flow of information and resources through the network.
Interestingly, he moves between Venezuela, where he is a naturalized citizen and is even
registered to vote, and Cuba.88 On several occasions he has met with President Hugo Chavez,
former Venezuelan Interior Minister Ramon Rodriguez Chacin, and Senior Venezuelan
Generals Hugo Carvajal and Rangel Silva. He has also been a guest of honor at many of
the Bolivarian celebrations hosted by President Chavez and has numerous contacts at many
levels with the Venezuelan DISIP (the Venezuelan Internal Security Service). Escobar was
once captured by bounty hunters, who turned him over to Colombian Army in 2004, but
in an effort to achieve the release of a prominent FARC hostage, Ingrid Betancourt, and to
assuage the pressure of Betancourt’s champion, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, he was
freed by President Uribe although no hostages (including Betancourt) were freed by the
FARC in return.89
Jesus Emilio Carvajalino Carvajalino
Also Known As: Alias Andre´s Parı´s and Commander Ariel
Jesus Emilio Carvajalino Carvajalino ranks in more than 60 percent of the metrics
used for this analysis, including the following: both brokerage potential measures, the gate-
keeper/ representative metric, both emerging leader measures, and the two fragmentation
algorithms (Tables 1–3). These results suggest he possesses relatively high brokerage poten-
tial within the leadership network and between the FARC and actors outside of Colombia.
Indeed, his membership in the FARC’s International Front and General Staff place him in
a structurally advantageous position within the leadership network, while his involvement
in the international drug trade and his contacts in several Central and South American
countries, including Venezuela and Mexico, makes him a critical actor to the FARC’s in-
ternational operations.90 His former role as the FARC’s representative to Venezuela from
1996–2000, including his direct contacts with Venezuelan officials involved in the 1999
Colombia–FARC peace talks, and his reported residences in both Colombia and Venezuela
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first in both emerging leader measures, thus indicating his potential to continue gaining
clout within the FARC leadership network. He is reportedly suffering from health issues,
however, which will likely reduce his ability to act on this potential.92
Orlay Jurado Palomino
Also Known As: Hermes, Anibal, Mauricio, and Hermes Aguilera
Orlay Jurado Palomino ranks in over half of the metrics used for this analysis. The
results in Table 1 suggest he likely serves as a key broker of information and resources
within the FARC leadership network. Along with Granda and Carvajalino, Palomino is a
key member of the FARC’s International Front and also a member of the General Staff.
He is reportedly Granda’s “right-hand” man, which certainly contributes to his high-level
status within the International Front and the FARC in general. In fact, Palomino reportedly
took over for Granda during the latter’s incarceration during the 2004 “Granda Affair.”93
Palomino has also served as an operative in Brazil, where he reportedly used to live,
and he has served as an operative in Venezuela, where he currently resides. His high-
level of activity in the region is further highlighted by his contacts in other countries,
namely Argentina, Paraguay, and Cuba. He does not, however, simply serve as a diplomatic
representative in the region; he was implicated in the kidnapping and killing of former
Paraguayan President Raul Cubas’s daughter in 2004.94 Interestingly, he does not appear to
receive the same notoriety that others do with similar qualifications; this is probably due to
his relatively minor involvement in the international drug trade. Nevertheless, his emerging
leader potential and his ability to continue gaining prominence in the leadership network
is questionable given his alleged health problems.95
Hernan Dario Velazquez Saldarriaga
Also Known As: Oscar El Paisa, El Paisa, Hermides Buitrago, Oscar Montero, and Oscar
Moreno
Hernan Dario Velazquez Saldarriaga, better known as “El Paisa,” is a member of
the General Staff and is a key actor within the Southern Bloc. He is best known as the
overall commander of the FARC’s Teo´filo Ferero Mobile Column (TFMC), which is one
of the FARC’s most aggressive columns and acts as a Special Forces unit out of the
department of Caqueta´. The TFMC, on the orders of El Paisa, has been involved in several
notable operations, including the kidnapping of Congressman Jorge Eduardo Gechem, the
kidnapping and killing of Caqueta´ Governor Luis Francisco Cuellar in 2009, and the 2003
car bombing of El Nogal club in Bogota´ that killed 36 and wounded approximately 200
more.96 Consequently, El Paisa is a high value target of the Colombian government and
the Department of Justice (DoJ) has offered a reward of up to $1,000,000 for information
leading to his capture.97 His ruthlessness affects FARC members as well; he has reportedly
ordered the assassination of many FARC affiliates.98 Thus, it makes sense that several
metrics (betweenness centrality, the consultant and gatekeeper/ representative metrics, and
both key player fragmentation algorithms) identified him as an important actor within the
FARC’s leadership network. Furthermore, El Paisa’s potential to serve as an emerging
leader (Table 3), along with his leadership in one of the FARC’s most audacious units and
the health problems of several other key players outlined in this analysis, suggest he is
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Erasmo Traslavina Benavides
Also Known As: Jimmy Guerrero and Ismardo Mucia Lozada
Erasmo Traslavina Benavides, commonly known as Jimmy Guerrero, is the current
commander of the FARC’s 33rd Front and is a member of the General Staff. He reportedly
operates out of Venezuela along the Colombian–Venezuelan border near Norte de Santander.
Benavides is known to participate heavily in narcotics trafficking, and he is listed in the
DoJ’s Reward List offering up to $1,000,000 for information leading to his capture.99
Table 3 indicates that Benavides ranks seventh overall and places in the two brokerage
potential measures, the gatekeeper/representative metric, the two fragmentation algorithms,
and the cognitive demand emerging leader measure (Tables 1–3). Interestingly, he is one
of the two top ten actors who lives outside of Colombia and is also not a member of the
International Front, suggesting that the FARC’s internationalization extends beyond the
group’s diplomatic body. Benavides’s potential to continue gaining influence, as indicated
by the cognitive demand measure in Table 3, is only likely to increase in the future. In fact,
his ascension through the ranks appears to have already begun; he only became the overall
commander of the 33rd Front in late 2011.100
Luis Alberto Alba´n Urbano
Also Known As: Marcos Calarca´ and Marco Leo´n Calarca´
Luis Alberto Alba´n Urbano is a member of the FARC’s International Front. The results
suggest he serves as a potential broker of information and resources, a key player in the
leadership network, and has the potential to continue gaining influence with the FARC
leadership network (Tables 1–3). Interestingly, he attempts to participate in every left-wing
event scheduled in Latin America and Europe in order to expand the FARC’s support
network. Additionally, he lobbies the leadership of the major left-wing parties in Latin
America and Europe in an attempt to entice them to soften their positions on issues related
to narcotics trafficking. Urbano has reportedly visited Cuba, Venezuela, Peru, Costa Rica,
and Mexico, has ties to Bolivia,101 and he used to live in Canada with his family where they
had developed an extensive support network.102 He has actively worked to expand FARC
influence in Mexico while working there from 1997–2002 with members of the Mexican
Popular Socialist Party.103 Today, Urbano reportedly resides in Brazil where he suffers from
health problems.104 Through these multiple international and political contacts Urbano has
steered national policies and positions in directions that favor the FARC’s activities. He is
assisted by his sons: Rau´l Ernesto Alba´n Torres, who works as an agro-ecology professor
in the Universidad Bolivariana of Venezuela and is one of the main leaders of the left-wing
Coordinadora Continental Bolivariana (Bolivarian Continental Coordinator) in Caracas,
and Juan Jacobo Alba´n, a sociology student at the University of Havana and a member of
the FARC’s International Commission.105
Summary
Table 4 summarizes the role and geographical location of the eight key individuals identified
in this article’s analysis. What is striking is that only one of these leaders currently lives
in Colombia full time—Hernan Dario Velasquez Saldarriaga. The rest live outside of
Colombia’s borders in some capacity: two bounce between Colombia and Venezuela, one
between Venezuela and Cuba, another between Colombia and Brazil, and three live in
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Table 4
The FARC’s international connections
Name Position Colombia Venezuela Brazil Cuba






































in several other countries, including Canada, Ecuador, Peru, Argentina, Paraguay, Cuba,
Mexico, Bolivia, and Costa Rica, to name a few. While we could expect the members of
the International Front to live abroad, the fact that several other key players live abroad is
somewhat surprising and lends empirical support that the FARC is becoming increasingly
internationalized. This is not to argue this is an entirely new phenomenon or that the FARC
is abandoning Colombia as its prime area of operations, but it does suggest that attempts
to disrupt the FARC in the future will need to take the FARC’s international character (and
key players) into account.
Conclusion
This article has explored the transformation of the FARC from a local insurgency to
a internationally connected organization that has been serving as a proxy of the South
American Bolivarian movement led by Venezuela President Hugo Chavez. After a brief
overview of the FARC’s history and social structure, it drew on the tools of social network
analysis to identify key leaders who are actively engaged in the FARC’s current operations.
It then turned to a discussion of these key leaders, highlighting their current roles within
the FARC and what their prominence might suggest about the insurgency’s future. In
particular, this article has empirically demonstrated that the FARC is more than a local or
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government’s improved counterinsurgency efforts, which has forced many FARC leaders
to seek sanctuary outside of Colombia. Nevertheless, as was noted in 1993 the FARC
established the COMINTER (International Front) to serve as its diplomatic body to help
attract broad international support, which meant that an institutional structure was already
in place to help facilitate the FARC’s transformation. Thus, it should be unsurprising
that individuals with ties to the FARC’s international bloc are currently in positions of
influence and appear to be in position to take on increasing levels of responsibility and
coordination. Moreover, the FARC has become increasingly adept at tapping into regional
ideological themes advocated by President Hugo Chavez, which suggests that the FARC
may be taking a page from the manual of the terrorist group Hezbollah in developing a
transnational strategy to export their influence while seeking legitimacy alongside Chavez’s
Bolivarian movement. If so, although the FARC’s future appears to be dim as a Colombian-
centric movement, it appears to be brighter as an international one. By focusing on limiting
the influence of the aforementioned FARC’s central, key, and emergent leaders and their
transnational aspirations, the international community can work to hinder the growth of
this potentially destabilizing influence.
Clearly, more work needs to be done with regard to the FARC. This analysis has
only begun to scrape the surface of the FARC’s transformation. One potentially promising
avenue of research is to expand the network data used in this analysis to include additional
relational data of insurgent groups such as the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland
and Freedom—ETA) and Eje´rcito del Pueblo Paraguayo (Parguayan People’s Party—EPP)
as well as government officials from Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Ecuador. Building out the
data to include other non-members of the FARC but who have ties with the FARC could help
identify individuals through which international authorities can exert a pacifying influence
on the FARC. Another approach that would undoubtedly yield considerable benefits would
be to overlay these relational data with geospatial data. Such an analysis could provide
additional insights into the dynamics of the FARC network and offer possibilities for its
disruption. Finally, a longitudinal analysis of the FARC could help tease out how its structure
has varied over time (e.g., has it become more or less centralized) and identify the causes
behind significant changes in the network.106 Not only would such studies help researchers
better understand the nature of insurgent networks, but they could also aid analysts in the
disruption or destabilization of such networks.
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